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Introduction
This paper addresses the applicability of the public
performance right when software creators license copyrighted
music to include on software that is sold and delivered
directly over the Internet. This happens when the maker of a
computer game licenses a popular song to play along with the
action on the computer screen. The thesis of this paper is
that when the software is bought from a site on the Internet,
and then digitally downloaded to a consumer, a public
performance has occurred under section 106(4) of the
Copyright Act.'
The first section of this paper will address the overlapping
classifications of our hypothetical game and accompanying
music, and how the public performance right in the
underlying musical composition is involved. Next will follow a
discussion of current Internet technology and how electronic
commerce may implicate the public performance right under
the Copyright Act. Finally, this note will discuss the
Copyright Act's legislative history, the relevant positions
taken by the Clinton Administration, and the reactions of the
legal community that shed light on whether a public
performance has taken place when one downloads software
including copyrighted music from the Internet.
I
Classification of Computer Games That Include
Accompanying Sounds Under Copyright Act Sections
101 and 102
Section 102 of the Copyright Act sets forth eight broad
categories that qualify as "works of authorship" under the
Copyright Act.2 The legislative history explains that the
categories are "overlapping in the sense that a work falling
within one class may encompass works coming within some
1. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1995).
2. These are: 1) literary works; 2) musical works, including any
accompanying words; 3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; 5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works; 6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 7) sound recordings;
and 8) architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1995).
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or all of the other categories. "'
Our hypothetical game implicates several of the
categories listed in section 102 including literary works,
musical works (including accompanying words), sound
recordings, and audiovisual works.
The following sections will address how these
classifications may overlap and create concurrent rights in
our hypothetical computer game. This will explain how the
public performance right in musical compositions is
implicated by the digital downloading of a software program
that includes copyrighted music.
A. Computer Games That Include Accompanying Sounds Are
Considered "Audiovisual Works" Under 17 U.S.C. § 101
Although computer programs are usually considered
"literary works" under the definition in section 101 of the
Copyright Act,5 computer games that have sequential visual
images synchronized with sounds have been labeled
audiovisual works by the courts.'
Audiovisual works are defined under section 101 of the
Copyright Act as follows:
[Works that consist of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines
or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such asS 7
films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
3. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5666.
4. See id.
5. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a literary work as "works, other
than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or
numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or
cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995); see also Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir.
1983). This case concerned the copyright to an "operating system program"
which is defined as a program that generally manages the internal functions of
the computer or facilitates an application program. See id. at 1243-44.
6. See Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 278
(4th Cir. 1989) (holding that video games are copyrightable as audiovisual
works.). The subject program in this case is distinguished from the program in
Apple Computer that did not show a series of related images along with
accompanying sounds. 714 F. 2d. at 1243-44.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995).
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Because video games consist of related images intended
to be viewed through computers together with accompanying
sounds, they are considered audiovisual works.8  Our
hypothetical computer game that includes licensed
copyrighted music is an audiovisual work because its images
are intended to be shown on a computer along with the
copyrighted music. Note also that in our hypothetical game,
the music is synchronized with the action, and is not simply
background music taking place during some operation, such
as searching or booting up. It is, therefore, an audiovisual
work. 9
B. Computer Games That Include Copyrighted Music Are
"Derivative Works" Under 17 U.S.C. § 101
Many software manufacturers who create video games
played on computers include copyrighted music in their
games. Often, music by a particular artist can enhance the
value of the game to the consumer. This section explores the
classification of the underlying composition when it is
conjoined with a computer game under 17 U.S.C. § 103.
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a derivative work
as one that is "[Biased upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a ... sound recording ... or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of ... modifications which, as a whole, represent
an original work of authorship, is a "'derivative work.""
The maker of the computer game must have made a
substantial, not merely trivial, contribution to the preexisting
music to consider the game derivative under section 101.1 In
our hypothetical computer game with accompanying
copyrighted music, video has been enhanced by audio and
vice-versa. This would not be a trivial contribution because
the resultant program transforms the visual portion of the
game from a literary work to an audiovisual work, and the
musical work is transformed into an audiovisual work.
C. Copyright in the Underlying Composition is Not Affected by
8. See id.
9. See Kevin J. Harrang, Licensing Issues in Creating and Publishing
Multimedia Software Products, 418 PLI/PAT 289, 314 (1995).




Section 103 of the Copyright Act ensures that the
copyright in the underlying composition remains unaffected.12
Section 103 of the Copyright Act provides that:
[tihe copyright in a... derivative work.., does not imply
any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The
copyright in such work is independent of, and does not
affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or
subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting
material. 13
This is significant because owners of the underlying
musical composition in our hypothetical game may be able to
exercise their exclusive right to public performance when the
game is downloaded from the Internet.'4 Even though the
underlying composition has become part of an audiovisual
work, section 103 operates to preserve the exclusive rights
granted a copyright owner in all preexisting material.
Therefore, owners of the underlying composition included in
our hypothetical game retain the exclusive right to publicly
perform the audiovisual work that contains their
compositions. 15
D. Copyright in the Underlying Musical Composition is
Distinct from the Copyright in the Sound Recording
Section 101 does not define "musical works" because its
meaning is self-evident.' 6 House Report 94-1476 explains that
a musical composition is copyrightable regardless of whether
it is embodied electronically or in some other concrete form.
7
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1995).
13. Id.
14. Note that although sound recordings are generally denied a public
performance right, Congress has recently recognized a public performance right
to certain types of digital transmissions of sound recordings. See Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended in various sections of United States Code
Title 17) The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
probably does not directly apply to the distribution of a computer game over the
Internet, but it may show legislative direction toward expanding the
performance right to sound recordings. But this note only deals with the
performance right in the underlying composition.
15. See discussion of the public performance right under 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)
(1995) infra Part II.
16. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53, 1976, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5667.
17. See id.
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The underlying musical composition is separate and
distinct from "sound recordings" which are defined in section
101 of the Copyright Act as "works that result from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but
not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work," regardless of the material
objects... in which they are embodied." 9
One author has used a cookie chef analogy to describe
the difference between the underlying musical composition
and the sound recording." After a chef has baked a
particularly tasty batch of cookies, he may choose to write the
recipe down.2 ' A consumer cannot eat the recipe itself, but
any other chef may use the recipe to make cookies that taste
similar.22 The cookie recipe is analogous to an underlying
musical composition, and similar tasting cookies created by
another chefs use of the recipe are analogous to a sound
recording.23
As with the cookie recipe, when a songwriter fixes her
work of authorship in a tangible medium such as a tape-
recording or sheet music, a copyright is created in the
underlying composition.24 Another musician, however, may
use the sheet music to learn the song and then create his
own sound recording which is separately copyrightable. 5
Even when such a new sound recording is created, the
copyright in the underlying composition remains inviolate.
Both rights coexist.
The author that introduced the cookie recipe analogy also
gave the specific example of the Beatles' version of the song
18. Note that although the definition of "sound recording" specifically
excludes those accompanying an audiovisual work (which we have determined
captures the essence of our hypothetical computer game), section 103 preserves
any preexisting copyright in the sound recording because the game is a
derivative work. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1995).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995).
20. See A. Dustin Mets, Did Congress Protect the Recording Industry into
Competition? The Irony of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act,




24. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (1995). Note that the owner of the copyright in
the underlying composition is also creating a sound recording when he fixes his
work in a tape-recording. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995).
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1995).
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'Iist and Shout., 26 The song was written by Phil Medley and
Bert Russell. Medley and Russell own the underlying
composition. The Beatles created a separate sound recording
of the composition which is also protected under 17 U.S.C. §
102.27 As a result, if someone wants to license the Beatles'
'Twist and Shout" to play along with the action on a video
game, he or she must negotiate a synchronization license
from the owner of the underlying composition, and then get a
separate synchronization license from the owner of the sound
recording.28
II
The Exclusive Right to Public Performance
Under 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants the copyright
owners the exclusive rights to reproduction, adaptation,
distribution, display, and public performance." Although
digitally delivering our hypothetical computer game
implicates some of the other rights listed, this note deals only
with the right to public performance of the underlying
composition.
The right of public performance under section 106(4)
extends to musical compositions and audiovisual works."°
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines "perform" as follows:
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or
act it, either directly or by means of any device or process
or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the
sounds accompanying it audible.
3
1
In the case of our hypothetical game with accompanying
music, the audiovisual work is "performed" within the
26. See Mets, supra note 20 at 373-74.
27. "Copyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship...
[which] include... sound recordings." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1995).
28. A synchronization license is required when one wants to synchronize
music with a visual work. Whether the music will be synchronized with a visual
work is significant because mechanical licenses for music-only recordings are
mandatory, that is, they must be granted by the owner of the underlying
composition at a maximum rate set by statute. Synchronization licenses are not
mandatory and can be negotiated freely or refused. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1995).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1995).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (4) (1995). Sound recordings do not currently enjoy the
exclusive right to public performance. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1995).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995).
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meaning of the statute whenever its images are shown or the
sounds accompanying it are made audible. A more complex
and difficult determination is whether the performance was
"public." If the performance is deemed "public," then the
copyright holders of the audiovisual work, and in the case of
a derivative work, the copyright owners of any preexisting
works,32 maintain an exclusive right under 106(4) of the
Copyright Act.33
Section 10 1 of the Copyright Act explains that to perform
a work "publicly" means:
1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at
any place where a substantial number of persons outside of
a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is
gathered; or
2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or
display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to
the public, by means of any device or process, whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance
or display receive it in the same place or in separate places
and at the same time or at different times.
Public performance covers not only the initial rendition,
but any subsequent transmission. 35 A public performance
thus occurs in all of the following situations: when a
musician performs the song in front of an audience, when a
broadcasting network transmits that performance (whether
simultaneous or from a tape recording), when a local
broadcaster transmits that network broadcast, and when a
cable television company retransmits that performance to its
subscribers. 36 It is clear from the above example that many
separate public performances can take place from what at
first blush seems to be one occurrence. One musician sings a
song, and several people listen and view the performance at
their home. Although this may appear to be one public
performance, each broadcaster is engaging in a separate
public performance from the one committed by the musician.
In Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc,
the defendant provided private screening rooms for up to four
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1995).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1995).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995).
35. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 52 (1976).
36. See id.
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people to watch movies on videotape.37 The movies were
played on a video player at a central location and then piped
into the screening rooms.38 The question for the court was
whether the performance was public. 39 Defendant argued that
since the screening rooms were only accessible to the
individuals who rented the rooms, the performance could not
be public. 40 The Redd Home court, however, found that the
transmission of a performance to members of the public even
in private areas constitutes a public performance."
The House Report which accompanies the Copyright
Revision Act of 1976 explains tha "a performance made
available by transmission to the public at large is 'public'
even though the recipients are not gathered in a single place,
and even if there is no proof that any of the potential
recipients was operating his receiving apparatus at the time
of the transmission. ,
42
The Report goes on to explain that even when the
audience is a very limited portion of the public such as hotel
room occupants or cable television subscribers, the same
principles apply.43
In the case of a cable television subscription, the House
Report's determination that it creates a public performance
rests upon the assumption that cable television is
44transmitted to the public. Even though each viewer may see
the broadcast alone in the privacy of his or her home at
different times, cable television is disseminated to the public,
and therefore creates a public performance for the purposes
of section 106(4) of the Copyright Act.45
The following section will evaluate relevant technology
and the process by which consumers can have computer
games digitally delivered to their home computers. Then, the
question of whether copyrighted music included in those
games is publicly performed during this delivery will be
37. 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
38. See Ad.
39. See id. at 157.
40. See Ad.
41. See id. at 159
42. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 64-65 (1976).
43. See id. at 65.
44. See id
45. See id.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 21:829
addressed.
III
Delivery of Computer Programs Containing
Copyrighted Music Over the Internet
The Internet was originally created by the Department of
Defense in 1969 for the purpose of creating a computer
network system capable of functioning regardless of whether
portions of the system were disabled.46 Because the network
is designed to route itself around the disabled areas and
continue to function, there is no way to "turn off' the Internet
as long as any systems are functioning on the network.4 7 In
1981, the Internet was a network of 300 computers.48 In 1993
there were over 90,000 computers linked to the Internet.49
Today the Internet links millions of computers together. °
A. Electronic Commerce
In addition to being able to communicate with one
another, consumers are utilizing the Internet to conduct
commerce. 5' Prominent research companies disagree on how
much commerce is actually taking place, but they all
estimate that commerce is at minimum doubling every year. 2
For example, Forrester Research estimated that Internet
commerce, access, services, software, and hardware
accounted for one billion dollars in 1996, and that by year
2000 Internet activity would account for ten billion dollars. 3
Today many consumers are making decisions, placing
orders for product, and making payment over the Internet. 4
Often delivery of the product is handled through U.S. Mail.55
46. See Llewellyn J. Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-
Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in
Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475, 488 (1997).
47. See id. at 488-89.
48. See id. at 488.
49. See id.
50. See id.
5 1. See G. L. Grant, Business Models for the Internet and New Media, 545
PLI/PAT 39, 44 (1999).
52. See Ad.
53. See id. at 42, 44.
54. See id. at 53.
55. See id. at 55.
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But on-line delivery of the product itself, concurrent with
payment, is the next logical step in the evolution of Internet
commerce.56 To effect this transaction, the goods purchased
obviously must be reducible to digital form, and cannot be
tangible like computer hardware. Computer software and
music are both conducive to this type of transaction, and
therefore may one day be exclusively distributed through this
medium. Because of this possibility, copyright owners are
anxious to assert rights that are implicated by downloading
product to a home computer.
B. Delivery of Product on the Internet
Much of the discussion of public performance rights to
copyrighted material downloaded from the Internet pertains
to sound recordings.57  With recent improvements in
technology, it has become possible to transmit CD-quality
music over the Internet. 58 Because a sound recording
embodies a musical composition, and our hypothetical game
with accompanying copyrighted music is considered an
audiovisual work, derived for the purposes of section 103 of
the Copyright Act from the underlying composition therein,59
the discussion of commentators on the applicability of the
public performance right to sound recordings is relevant.
That is, the same factors that determine whether a sound
recording is publicly performed during a digital download will
determine whether an audiovisual work is publicly performed
during a digital download.
Today music can be delivered by "streaming," or
"downloading."6 ° This distinction can be very important when
56. See id. at 53.
57. See Kent D. Stuckey, Internet and Online Law, 526 PLI/PAT 419. 510-
517 (1998). See also David L. Hayes, Advanced Copyright Issues on the Internet,
7 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 29-34 (1998). See also Neil J. Rosini, Copyright
Category Confusion and its Consequences: Online Transmissions and the Right of
Exclusive Use Under Copyright, 16 SPG ENT. & SPORTS L. 11, 13-15 (1998). See
also Bob Kohn, A Primer on the Law of Webcasting and Digital Music Delivery,
20 No. 4 ENT. L. REP. 4 (1998). See also Adam P. Segal, Dissemination of
Digitized Music on the Internet: A Challenge to the Copyright Act, 12 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 97 (1996).
58. See Neil J. Rosini & Howard M. Singer, Music and the Internet, 545
PLI/PAT 865, 870 (1999).
59. See supra Part L.A-C.
60. See Rosini & Singer, supra note 58.
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debating the applicability of the public performance right.
"Streaming" allows the consumer to listen to music from
websites in real time.6' Much like a jukebox, the consumer
chooses the song, and then listens as it is being
transmitted. As will be discussed later, it is significant that
the transmission is simultaneous with the consumer's
perception of the product. There is little dissent from the
position that streaming audio creates a public performance.63
"Downloading" entails transferring the data to the
consumer's hard drive where it is stored in memory. 6' The
consumer may choose to perceive the product sooner or later.
Whether this creates a public performance is a hotly debated
issue.
Iv
Does Downloading an Audiovisual Work
Create a Public Performance?
Recall that the courts deemed a performance "public"
when it was transmitted to the public.65 Because the public
can access a retail website and download digital products
that they choose to this transmission would certainly be "to
the public," under the reasoning in Redd Home. The issue
that remains is whether a "performance" has occurred when a
consumer digitally downloads a purchased audiovisual work
from the Internet. Legal commentators disagree on this issue.
A. The Clinton Administration on Public Performance
Simultaneous with Transmission
During the Senate Hearings on S.227, the Digital
Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995,66 the
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Hayes, supra note 57.
64. See Rosini & Singer, supra note 58.
65. See On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,
777 F. Supp. 787, 789 (N.D. Cal. 1991). See also Columbia Pictures Industries,
Inc. v. Redd Home, 749 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1984).
66. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended in various sections of 17
U.S.C.). The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 created
a very limited right in public performance for sound recordings designed to
accommodate changing channels of distribution of sound recordings. Although
this paper deals only with the performance right as applied to underlying
19991
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Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks, Bruce Lehman, was asked by the
committee whether S.227 should define when digital
transmission of a copyrighted work amounts to a
performance. His reply was that this issue should be
decided on a case-by-case basis by the courts.68 Later in his
testimony, Assistant Secretary Lehman said that it was the
tentative conclusion of the Information Infrastructure Task
Force that both a public performance and a distribution
could happen simultaneously on the Internet.6 9 But again,
Lehman said that whether a transaction creates a public
performance, a distribution, or both should be a question for
the courts on a case-by-case basis.7 °
The final version of the National Information
Infrastructure Report (the "White Paper") made the distinction
between transmissions of copies of works and transmissions
of performances of works'.7 According to the White Paper,
when a work is shown to a user over the Internet so that he
or she may watch it as it is transmitted with or without
copying it, a performance has taken place.72 But when a copy
is transmitted so that it is "captured in a user's computer,
without the capability of simultaneous 'rendering' or
'showing,' it has clearly not been performed."73 Actually, this
is not clear at all, and it may be wrong. 4
B. Congress on Performance Simultaneous with Transmission
During its discussion of voluntary negotiation of
reasonable terms and statutory royalty rates for compulsory
compositions, the analysis of when a transmission amounts to a performance is
equally applicable to both situations.
67. See The Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Hearings
on S. 227 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. S. Hrg.
104-709, at 46 (March 9, 1995).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 50.
70. See id.
71. See Information Infrastructure Task Force, The Report of the Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights (Bruce A. Lehman, Chair), Intellectual
Property and the National Information Infrastructure (hereinafter the White
Paper), at 71 (Sept. 1995).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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mechanical license under the Digital Performance Right In
Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (the DPRSRA), the Senate
sought to distinguish between the rate applicable to digital
deliveries in general, and digital deliveries that are incident to
transmission of a performance.7" This was significant because
the Senate suggested in this report that a digital delivery that
amounts to a reproduction or distribution under the
Copyright Act, in certain circumstances may be primarily a
performance, even though it is also technically a reproduction
or distribution.
The report explains that if a user's computer has to
temporarily store the delivered data in order to execute the
transmission of a performance, a reproduction or distribution
may have occurred." This would be the case even if a
transmission system was meant to deliver a performance in
real time because a reproduction would be made in order to
do so. But the reproduction or distribution is merely
incidental to the performance, warranting a lower rate for a
mechanical license due to the necessity of acquiring a public
performance license from the owner of the work.77 The report
suggests that statutory mechanical royalty rates should be
lower in cases where the digital delivery is incidental to the
transmission whose purpose and effect is to cause a
performance."
This analysis by the Senate Report has caused some
commentators to conclude that since you cannot readily tell
the difference between a digital delivery that is a reproduction
or distribution and one that is incidental to a performance, all
digital deliveries of sound recordings and audiovisual works
should be regarded as performances.
79
75. S. REP. No. 95-128, at 39 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 386.
76. See id. Note that the exclusive rights to reproduction and distribution
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) (3) in the case of digital delivery of copyrighted works
are not addressed here. They are only mentioned to illustrate Congress'
cognizance of a performance right to digital deliveries of copyrighted works.
77. See id.
78. See id. "[Sltatutory mechanical royalty rates shall distinguish between
'incidental' -digital phonorecord deliveries that take into account the different
purpose and effect of these transmissions and digital phonorecord deliveries in
general."
79. See Bob Kohn, A Primer on the Law of Webcasting and Digital Music
Delivery 20 No. 4 ENT. L. REP. 4, (1998) (explaining that the performance rights
societies who administer the public performance rights for songwriters and
publishers, such as BMI, ASCAP, and SESAC, have made this argument).
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C. Isochronous and Asynchronous Transmissions
Further explicating the distinction explained in the White
Paper between simultaneous "rendering" of a digital
transmission and downloading a transmission to be perceived
at a later time by the user, legal commentators have used the
terms "isochronous" and "asynchronous."80 A transmission
that is immediately converted into a playback of the work, is
technically referred to as an isochronous transmission.8 '
However, if the transmission is either faster or slower than
the perception of the work by the end user, then the
transmission is considered asynchronous.82 As we saw from
the discussion in the White Papery, this distinction can have
important implications for the determination of whether a
performance has taken place. However, this distinction may
be a faulty one for really ascertaining the difference between
whether a performance has occurred or not.
Due to the nature of Internet technology, and due to the
reality that different computers receive and transmit
information at varying speeds, all transmissions through the
Internet are at least partly asynchronous.84 This has led some
commentators to the conclusion that the determination of
whether a performance has occurred should be based on
what the user receives, instead of the transmission
technology used.85 This would be consistent with the above-
cited Senate Report,8  which suggests that quick
transmissions that require brief memory storage before
prompt playback may be public performances.87
80. See Kent D. Stuckey, Internet and Online Law 526 PLI/PAT 419, 512
(1998). See also David L. Hayes, Advanced Copyright Issues on the Internet 7
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 30 (1998); see also Bob Kohn, A Primer on the Law of
Webcasting and Digital Music Delivery 20 No. 4 ENT. L. REP. 4, (1998).
81. Kent D. Stuckey, Internet and Online Law 526 PLI/PAT 419, 512 (1998).
82. Id.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
84. See Hayes, supra note 80.
85. See id.
86. S. REP. NO. 104-128 at 39 (1995).
87. See id. "[If a transmission system was designed to allow transmission
recipients to hear sound recordings substantially at the time of transmission,
but the sound recording was transmitted in a high-speed burst of data and
stored in a computer memory for prompt playback (such storage being
technically the making of a phonorecord), and the transmission recipient could
not retain the phonorecord for playback on subsequent occasions (or for any
other purpose,) delivering the phonorecord to the transmission recipient would
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Kent Stuckey argues that although recipients of
asynchronous transmissions may "render" the work as soon
as they get it, or at a later time, the transmitter hasn't
performed the work any more than has the retailer who sells
a CD to a consumer who then opens the CD and immediately
plays his purchase in a portable CD player.8  Since
audiovisual works and sound recordings embody
performances, Stuckey points out that if the isochronous
requirement were not adhered to, then any transmission of
audiovisual works and sound recordings would amount to a
performance.89
Other commentators claim that even though a work can
be downloaded to a user's computer without ever "rendering"
the work, it would be ignoring reality to maintain that no
performance took place.9" This is because the purpose of
downloading the sound recording or audiovisual work is to
perform it."
The harm that would occur if the public performance
right was extended to digital transmissions of audiovisual
works and sound recordings is that the music industry would
be "double-dipping." That is, a webcaster already paying for a
digital phonorecord delivery would also be required to pay for
a transmission, even if the phonorecord is not rendered
during the transaction." This may require the webcaster to
pay several more cents per transmission. Note, however, that
this cost can be passed on to the consumer who benefits from
the increased convenience of the digital delivery of product.
In light of the White Paper and Senate Report, it appears
that the technology of "streaming" discussed above would
implicate the public performance right, whereas
"downloading" would not. Unfortunately, the Internet is not
that simple.
The problem with this approach is that because of the
be incidental to the transmission."
88. See Stuckey, supra note 81 at 512-13.
89. See id. at 512.
90. Adam P. Segal, Dissemination of Digitized music on the Internet: A
Challenge to the Copyright Act, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 97,
118 (1996).
91. See id.
92. See Bob Kohn, A Primer on the Law of Webcasting and Digital Music
Delivery 20 No. 4 ENT. L. REP. 4, 8 (1998).
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limitations of Internet technology, a case-by-case
determination must be made whether, under the Senate
Report's language, the recipient perceives the work
substantially at the same time as transmission. Playing back
the work the next day is probably not "substantially" at the
same time as transmission. Playing back the work a few
seconds after transmission probably is. But what about one
or two minutes later? How about ten? If and when courts
make a bright line distinction that everyone can adhere to,
Internet sites will have a financial incentive to create a delay
in the digital delivery of copyrighted works in order to obviate
the need to secure a public performance license. When
technologies of broadcasting, communication, and
entertainment merge, this could have a chilling effect on the
purpose of copyright: to promote the useful arts by giving
authors exclusive rights in their writings.93 As companies
introduce the requisite delay, the public performance right is
no longer an exclusive right held by the author.
V
Conclusion
As audiovisual works, computer games that contain
copyrighted compositions are performed when digitally
downloaded to the public. Although this conclusion
contradicts the analysis of the White Paper, and of many legal
scholars, to hold otherwise would put the exclusive right to
public performance in jeopardy in this time of quickly
evolving technology. To endanger the right of public
performance is to chill the incentive of songwriters to create.
This certainly contradicts the purpose of the Copyright Act.
93. See H.R. REP. No. 94-176 at 47.
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